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Defending Against Statistical Steganalysis

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Abstract

The main purpose of steganography is to hide the occurrence of communication. While most methods in use today are invisible to the observer's senses, mathematical analysis may reveal statistical discrepancies in the stego medium. These discrepancies expose the fact that hidden communication is happening.

This paper presents a new method to preserve the statistical properties of the cover medium. After applying a correcting transform to an image, statistical steganalysis is no longer able to detect the presence of steganography. We present an *a priori* estimate to determine the amount of data that can be hidden in the image while still being able to maintain frequency count based statistics. This way, we can quickly choose an image in which a given message can be hidden safely. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we present statistical tests for the JPEG image format and explain how our new method defeats them.

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1 Introduction

Steganography is the art and science of hiding the fact that communication is happening. While classical steganographic systems depend on keeping the encoding system secret, modern steganography tries to be undetectable unless secret information is known, namely, a secret key. Because of their invasive nature, steganographic systems leave detectable traces within a medium's characteristics. This allows an eavesdropper to detect media that have been modified, revealing that secret communication is taking place. Although the secrecy of the information is not degraded, its hidden nature is revealed, which defeats the main purpose of steganography.

In general, the information hiding process starts by identifying redundant bits in the cover medium. Redundant bits are those bits that can be modified without destroying the integrity of the cover medium. The embedding process then selects a subset of the redundant bits to be replaced with data from the hidden message. Then, these redundant bits are replaced by message bits and inserted into the cover medium to create the stego medium.

Modifying redundant bits can change the statistical properties of the cover medium. For example, ones and zeros are equally likely in a hidden message that has been encrypted. However, the redundant data being replaced might have a strong correlation towards either zero or one. Embedding the hidden message weakens that correlation.

This paper presents a new method to preserve the statistical properties of a cover medium by applying additional transforms to the redundant data. The transforms correct measurable deviations in the statistics caused by the embedding process. We derive an *a priori* estimate for the amount of data that

can be hidden while still being able to preserve frequency count based statistics. As a result, we can quickly identify images in which a particular message can be hidden safely.

While the method of using additional transforms is a generic concept that is data format independent, statistical properties and the specific transforms to preserve them depend on the data format of the stego medium. We illustrate existing statistical tests for the JPEG image format. Although these tests are not capable of detecting data embedded with our OutGuess [6] system, we present a new test that does detect the presence of steganographic content. We then demonstrate a specific transform for the JPEG format that preserves the image's statistical properties and thus prevents detection from statistical tests based on frequency counts.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the prerequisites necessary for secure steganography and discusses related work in image steganography. In Section 3, we give a brief overview over the embedding process. After reviewing JPEG encoding in Section 4, we present statistical tests in Section 5. In Section 6, we show how to apply transforms that prevent detection by statistical tests. Section 7 provides an analysis of the transforms we use to correct deviations in the JPEG image format. We conclude in Section 8.

2 Prerequisites and Related Work

For steganography to remain undetected, the original cover medium needs to be an unknown¹. If it is known, a comparison between cover medium and stego medium reveals changes. While an adversary

¹Throughout, we use the terminology established by Pfitzmann et al. [5].

gains knowledge of only approximately half of the embedded bits, she still detects modification.

Zöllner et al. [11] propose an information theoretic approach to solve the problem of secure steganography by employing nondeterministic selection. In their model, the original medium is known to the adversary but a preprocessing step introduces randomness into the cover medium. If the adversary can not obtain the transformed cover medium, she can not deduce information about the embedded message by observing differences between the original and the stego medium. In summary, they suggest two necessary conditions for secure steganography:

- The secret key used to embed the hidden message is unknown to the adversary.
- The adversary does not know the actual cover medium.

In practice, these two conditions are easily met. It suffices to create a cover medium with a digital camera or by scanning holiday pictures, as long as the unmodified original is not made publicly available.

However, even though the original medium might not be available for comparison, the embedding process can introduce distortions. Analysis of many unmodified images may reveal characteristics that the modified images lack. Identification of these characteristics allows us to perform correcting transforms after the embedding process that preserve the desirable characteristics.

Ettinger [1] models the contest between the data-hider and his adversary as a game. He uses game theory to find the optimal game strategies. His model addresses only the scenario where the adversary tries to destroy embedded information without being able to detect it.

Johnson and Jajiodia [2] analyze images created with available steganographic software. Although they claim that current steganographic techniques leave noticeable distortions in the discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients, they do not further discuss the nature of these distortions.

Westfeld and Pfitzmann [10] describe visual and statistical attacks against common steganographic tools. They discuss ways that common steganographic techniques change statistical properties in

the cover medium. For example, they evaluate one particular program that embeds data in JPEG images. To detect hidden information embedded by the program, they use a χ^2 -test [4]. This test estimates the color distribution of an image carrying hidden information and compares it against the observed distribution.

Their χ^2 -test is perhaps too discriminating, in that it detects only programs that embed hidden message bits without spreading them over all redundant bits. In particular, their test does not detect the Out-Guess embedding process, presented in Section 3.

In Section 5, we describe an extended χ^2 -test that is capable of detecting more subtle changes. Even so, the methods presented in this paper prevent detection by both the original and the extended χ^2 -test.

3 Embedding Process

The specific transforms we introduce to perform statistical corrections depend on embedding methods that distribute the hidden message over all redundant bits. This section briefly explains the underlying steganographic embedding process. A detailed description can be found in a related paper [7].

We divide the task of embedding hidden information in a cover medium into two steps:

- Identification of redundant bits. Redundant bits can be modified without detectably degrading the cover medium.
- The selection of bits in which the hidden information should be placed.

3.1 Identification of Redundant Bits

In general, identifying the redundant bits of a data source depends on the specific data format. One has to be aware that the embedding actually happens when the cover medium is written out in its specific data format. Conversion to the final data format might include operations like compression, and is not necessarily deterministic. Minimizing modifications to the cover medium requires knowledge of the redundant bits before the actual stego medium is

created. For example, the OutGuess [6] system performs all operations involved in creating the output object and saves the redundant bits encountered. For the JPEG image format, this might be the LSB of the discrete cosine transform coefficients; see Section 4.

The hidden information overwrites the redundant bits when the final output is created. This requires determinism in the conversion process, which can always be ensured by replacing random processes with a pseudo-random number generator that is initialized to the same state for the identification and the final conversion step.

3.2 Selection of Bits

Before the selection of redundant bits can begin, an RC4 stream cipher [8] is initialized with a user-chosen secret key. We use the keyed stream cipher to encrypt the hidden message and derive a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for the selection process from it. The bits that are replaced with information from the hidden message are selected with the help of the pseudo-random number generator as follows.

First, we need to hide 32 state bits. The state is a concatenation of a 16-bit seed and a 16-bit integer containing the length of the hidden message. By varying the seed the selection can find a better embedding. Selection starts at the beginning of the identified bits. We determine the next bit by computing a random offset within a fixed interval and adding that offset to the current bit position. To compute the random offsets, we use the pseudo-random number generator described earlier. Data at the new bit position is replaced with the message data. This process is iterated 32 times. The resulting bit positions can be represented as,

$$\begin{aligned} b_0 &= 0 \\ b_i &= b_{i-1} + R_i(x) \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n \end{aligned}$$

where b_i is the position of the i -th selected bit, and $R_i(x)$ is a random offset in the interval $[1, x]$.

After the state data has been embedded, the pseudo-random number generator is reseeded with the 16-bit seed. The remaining length of the hidden message is used to adapt the interval out of which the random numbers are drawn to the amount of remaining data,

$$\text{interval} \approx \frac{2 \times \text{remaining bits in bitmap}}{\text{remaining length of message}}.$$

The selection process continues as outlined above, the only difference being that the interval is adjusted every eight bits. This way the hidden message is distributed evenly over all available bits.

Choosing the interval in this way restricts the hidden message size to a maximum of 50% of the available redundant bits. We explain in Section 6 why this is not a serious restriction. Not using all the redundant bits gives the selection process a greater opportunity to find a good embedding, described in related work [7]. It also leaves enough bits for the correcting transform to preserve frequency count based statistics.

Because the PRNG is keyed with a secret, it is not possible to find the hidden message without knowing the key. The recipient initializes the PRNG with that secret and uses the same selection process to retrieve the hidden message from the stego medium. The interval size is changed only after the state has been embedded, so the state is retrievable and can be used to reseed the pseudo-random number generator correctly.

4 JPEG image format

While the embedding methods mentioned in this paper are independent of the actual data format of the cover medium, each data format has its own statistical properties. We restrict our analysis to the most common data format: JPEG [9]. However, similar characteristics can also be found in other formats. The general idea of correcting statistical deviations still applies, but requires different, appropriate transforms.

The JPEG image format uses a discrete cosine transform (DCT) to transform successive 8×8 -pixel blocks of the image into 64 DCT coefficients each. The DCT coefficients $F(u, v)$, of an 8×8 block of image pixels $f(x, y)$, are given by

$$F(u, v) = \frac{1}{4}C(u)C(v) \left[\sum_{x=0}^7 \sum_{y=0}^7 f(x, y) * \cos \frac{(2x+1)u\pi}{16} \cos \frac{(2y+1)v\pi}{16} \right],$$




Figure 1: Differences in the DCT histograms are noticeable when the embedding process does not make any statistical corrections.

where $C(u), C(v) = 1/\sqrt{2}$ when u and v equal 0 and $C(u), C(v) = 1$ otherwise.

Afterwards the coefficients are quantized by the following operation:

$$F^Q(u, v) = \text{Integer Round} \left(\frac{F(u, v)}{Q(u, v)} \right),$$

where $Q(u, v)$ is a 64-element quantization table.

The least-significant bits of those quantized DCT coefficients, for which $F^Q(u, v) \neq 0$ and $\neq 1$, are used as redundant bits in which the hidden message is being embedded.

5 Statistical Tests

Statistical tests can reveal if an image has been modified by steganography. These tests determine if an image’s statistical properties deviate from the norm. Some tests are independent of the data format and just measure the entropy of the redundant data.

The simplest test is to measure the correlation towards one. A more sophisticated one is Ueli Maurer’s “Universal Statistical Test for Random Bit Generators” [3]. If we use a block size of eight bits, the expected result from the Maurer test for a truly random source is 7.184. We expect images with hid-

den data to have a higher entropy than those without.

Westfeld and Pfitzmann outline an interesting statistical attack in “Attacks on Steganographic Systems” [10]. They observe that for a given image, the embedding of encrypted data changes the histogram of color frequencies in a particular way.

In the following, we clarify their approach and show how it applies to the JPEG format. In their case, the embedding process changes the least significant bits of the colors in an image. The colors are addressed by their indices in the color table. If n_i and n_i^* are the frequencies of the color indices before and after the embedding respectively, then the following relation is likely to hold

$$|n_{2i} - n_{2i+1}| \geq |n_{2i}^* - n_{2i+1}^*|.$$

In other words, the frequency difference between adjacent colors is reduced by the embedding process. In an encrypted message, zeros and ones are equally distributed. For $n_{2i} > n_{2i+1}$ that means that the bits of the hidden message change n_{2i} to n_{2i+1} more frequently than the other way around.

The same is true in the case of the JPEG data format. Instead of measuring the color frequencies, we observe differences in the frequency of the DCT coefficients. Figure 1 displays the histogram before and after a hidden message has been embedded in a JPEG image. The histogram differences are displayed in the subgraph at the bottom of the figure. We observe a reduction in the frequency difference between the -1 and its adjacent DCT coefficient -2 . Adjacent means that the coefficients differ only in the least significant bit. A similar reduction in frequency difference can be observed between coefficients 2 and 3.

Westfeld and Pfitzmann use a χ^2 -test to determine whether the color frequency distribution in an image matches a distribution that shows distortion from embedding hidden data. In the following, we outline their test for the DCT coefficients in a JPEG. Because the test uses only the stego medium, the expected distribution y_i^* for the χ^2 -test has to be computed from the image. The assumption for a modified image is that adjacent DCT frequencies are similar. Let n_i be the DCT histogram, we then take the arithmetic mean,

$$y_i^* = \frac{n_{2i} + n_{2i+1}}{2},$$

to determine the expected distribution and compare against the observed distribution

$$y_i = n_{2i}.$$

The χ^2 value for the difference between the distributions is given as

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{\nu+1} \frac{(y_i - y_i^*)^2}{y_i^*},$$

where ν are the degrees of freedom, that is, the number of different categories in the histogram minus one. It may be necessary to sum adjacent values from the expected distribution and from the observed distribution to ensure that there are enough counts in each category. Westfeld and Pfitzmann require that each count is greater than four. If two adjacent categories are summed together, the degrees of freedoms need to be reduced by one.

The probability p that the two distributions are equal is given by the complement of the cumulative distribution function,

$$p = 1 - \int_0^{\chi^2} \frac{t^{(\nu-2)/2} e^{-t/2}}{2^{\nu/2} \Gamma(\nu/2)} dt,$$

where Γ is the Euler Gamma function.

The probability of embedding is determined by calculating p for a sample from the DCT coefficients. The samples start at the beginning of the image and for each measurement the sample size is increased.

Because the test uses an increasing sample size and always starts at the beginning of the image, it detects changes only if the frequency histogram is distorted continuously from the beginning of the image. Intermediate areas in the image that do not exhibit distortions can cause negative test results. This is the case even if other areas in the image are clearly distorted. For this reason, the test does not detect the embedding process described in this paper.

However, it is possible to create a new test that is more sensitive to partial distortions in an image. This new test is an extension of Westfeld and Pfitzmann's χ^2 -test. Observe that two identical distributions produce about the same χ^2 values in any part of the distribution. Instead of increasing the sample size and applying the test at a constant position, we use a constant sample size but slide the position where the samples are taken over the entire range of




Figure 2: An extended χ^2 -test where each sample covers 3.2% of the DCT coefficients detects the embedding in the modified image, but does not react to an unmodified image.

the image. Using the extended test we are able to detect our simple embedding process; see Figure 2. In this case, we set the sample size to 3.2% of all DCT coefficients. The tests starts at the beginning of the image, and the position is incremented by one percent for every χ^2 application. This extended test does not react to an unmodified image, but detects the embedding in some areas of the stego image.

6 Correcting Statistical Deviations

Not all of the redundant bits are used when embedding the hidden message. In fact, the selection process allows no more than half of the redundant bits to be used for data.

If we know what kind of statistical tests are being used to examine an image for modification, we can use the remaining redundant bits to correct any statistical deviation that the embedding process created.

Our first (naive) approach included preserving the correlation to one and the entropy measured by the Maurer test. Essentially, when a bit is changed from zero to a one, we try to change a nearby bit from one to zero. Although, this approach helps to prevent entropy increase in the redundant data, it completely neglects statistics that depend on macro-




Figure 3: The naive statistical corrections cause the frequency of adjacent DCT coefficients to be equalized. It is immediately evident that the image is modified.

scopic properties. For the JPEG format, the result is a distortion in the DCT histogram, illustrated in Figure 3. The DCT coefficients -2 and -1 are even closer together than in Figure 1. And the frequencies for DCT coefficients 2 and 3 are nearly the same.

Clearly, if we want to avoid distortions in the DCT histogram, additional corrections are necessary to maintain the distribution of the DCT coefficients. For example, suppose embedding a hidden message modifies the j -th DCT coefficient, $DCT(j)$. If $DCT(j) = 2i$, it will be modified to $2i + 1$. We correct this change by finding an adjacent coefficient $DCT(k)$, that is $DCT(k) = 2i + 1$, and changing it to $2i$. If we correct every change to the DCT coefficients, their histogram will be identical to the one of the original image.

Furthermore, a correcting transform that essentially swaps values keeps all frequency counts constant. Hence, no statistic that is based purely on frequency counts will be able to detect a difference between the original and the stego medium.

We make the following observation for frequency count based statistics. Let f be a frequency count in the histogram, and \bar{f} its adjacent count. Without loss of generality, let $f \geq \bar{f}$. Let α denote the fraction of redundant bits that are used to hold the hidden message. After embedding, we expect the




Figure 4: The fraction of the DCT coefficients that can be used for data hiding does not increase linearly for images with more DCT coefficients.

following changes in frequencies:

$$\begin{aligned} f^* &= f - \frac{\alpha}{2}(f - \bar{f}), \\ \bar{f}^* &= \bar{f} + \frac{\alpha}{2}(f - \bar{f}). \end{aligned}$$

In order for the transform to be able to correct the frequency count, enough unmodified coefficients need to be left in \bar{f} so that the change in f can be adjusted, in other words the relation

$$(1 - \alpha)\bar{f} \geq \frac{\alpha}{2}(f - \bar{f})$$

must hold.

The relation yields an *a priori* estimate for the fraction α of redundant bits that can be used for data hiding while still having enough bits left for the correcting transform to work:

$$\alpha \leq \frac{2\bar{f}}{f + \bar{f}}.$$

Given a hidden message, we can use the estimate to choose an image for which the correcting transform will be able to preserve the original frequency counts. Interestingly enough, for JPEG the fraction of redundant bits that can be used to hold the hidden message does not increase linearly for images with more DCT coefficients, see Figure 4.

The correcting transform has the following requirements:

1. For any part of the image, the distribution of the DCT coefficients should be similar to the unmodified image.
2. The number of corrections necessary to preserve statistical properties should be small.

Some statistical properties of the DCT coefficients may be unknown to us, so we try to prevent introducing additional distortions. Such distortions can result from corrections meant to preserve the statistics that we do know about. If we keep the number of additional modifications small, we reduce the likelihood of further distorting the image's statistical properties.

Furthermore, if steganography is to remain undetected by the extended χ^2 -test, all parts of the image must be free of statistical distortions. The test will detect no embedding if each part of the modified image has a DCT coefficient distribution similar to the original.

Algorithm 1 meets both requirements. It is run after the embedding process finishes. In step 1, we compute the DCT frequency histogram from the original image and store it in N . Step 2 determines the threshold frequencies. The threshold indicates how many errors in the histogram we are willing to tolerate for a specific DCT coefficient. It is calculated by multiplying the observed frequencies of the DCT coefficients with the scaling factor α . When the number of errors for a coefficient exceeds its threshold, we modify the image to preserve the statistics for that coefficient.

Step 3 finds $AdjDCT$, the index of the coefficient adjacent to the modified one. In step 4, we determine if there are pending errors for the adjacent coefficient that should be corrected. In that case, the correction for the current DCT coefficient can be traded against the pending correction of its adjacent coefficient.

If that is not the case, we check in step 5 if the number of errors for the coefficient, $N_{error}[DCT(i)]$, can be incremented without exceeding its threshold value. If another increment is possible, we continue with the next modification. Otherwise, we have to correct the current modification in the image. The $exchDCT$ algorithm is responsible for that. If that fails too, we just go ahead and increase the error for the coefficient above the threshold and take care of it later.

```

1  $N \leftarrow DCTFreqTable(original)$ ;
 $k \leftarrow$  number of coefficients in image;
2  $\alpha \leftarrow 0.03 * 5000/k$ ;
for  $i \leftarrow DCT_{min}$  to  $DCT_{max}$  do
     $N_{error}[i] \leftarrow 0$ ;
     $N^*[i] \leftarrow \alpha N[i]$ ;
endfor
for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $k$  do
    if  $DCT(i)$  unmodified then
        continue in loop;
    endif
3  $AdjDCT \leftarrow DCT(i) \oplus 1$ ;
4 if  $N_{error}[AdjDCT]$  then
    | decrement  $N_{error}[AdjDCT]$ ;
    | continue in loop;
    endif
5 if  $N_{error}[DCT(i)] < N^*[DCT(i)]$  then
    | increment  $N_{error}[DCT(i)]$ ;
    | continue in loop;
    endif
    if  $exchDCT(i, DCT(i))$  fails then
    | increment  $N_{error}[DCT(i)]$ ;
    | continue in loop;
    endif
endfor
for  $i \leftarrow DCT_{min}$  to  $DCT_{max}$  do
    while  $N_{error}[i] \neq 0$  do
    | decrement  $N_{error}[i]$ ;
    |  $exchDCT(k, i)$ ;
    endw
endfor

```

Algorithm 1: This transform preserves the statistical properties of an JPEG image. It keeps track of differences in the frequency counts between original and stego medium. If the differences exceed a certain threshold, the frequency count is adjusted.

After all modifications have been examined, we need to correct all remaining errors. Not all the corrections might be possible. However, if we are able to correct most of the errors, changes in the histogram are not detectable.

The $exchDCT()$ algorithm is very simple. Given a coefficient value DCT and a position i in the image, it tries to find the same coefficient at a prior position and change it to its adjacent coefficient. It starts searching near the coefficient that caused the algorithm to be executed and works its way to the beginning of the image. Coefficients that hold data from the hidden message or that have been used for previous corrections are skipped by $exchDCT()$.

The algorithm indicates success or failure.

```

Function: exchDCT()
Data :  $i, DCT$ 

 $AdjDCT \leftarrow DCT \oplus 1;$ 
for  $j \leftarrow i - 1$  to 1 do
  if  $DCT(j) = DCT$  and
   $DCT(j)$  does not hold data and
   $DCT(j)$  has not been used for corrections
  then
     $DCT(j) \leftarrow AdjDCT;$ 
    return success
  endif
endfor
return failure

```

Algorithm 2: Find a specific DCT coefficient and change it to its adjacent DCT coefficient.

7 Analysis

To evaluate our correction algorithm, we embed data into 54 pictures taken with a Fuji MX-1700 digital camera around Ann Arbor, Michigan. The size of the images is 640×480 pixels. After the images were downloaded from the camera, they were recompressed with a quality factor of 75. This simulates the conversion step in the embedding process without actually embedding any data.

For this set of images, the average number of DCT coefficients that we can use for modification is about 46,000, varying between 30,000 and 97,000. Each of these contributes one redundant bit.

Without embedding any data in the redundant bits, we notice a strong correlation towards one. On average, 63.8% of all the bits are set with a standard deviation of $\pm 3.4\%$ between images.

We embed the first chapter of Lewis Carroll’s “The Hunting of the Snark” into the images. After compression, the hidden message has a size of about 14,700 bits.

The correcting transform causes about 2967 ± 434 additional changes to the redundant data. That is approximately 20% of the size of the hidden message. The average number of differences that could not be corrected is 186 ± 400 . The majority of corrections fail for images for which the *a priori* estimate

Method	One-Correlation	Maurer Test
Unmodified	$63.77\% \pm 3.37\%$	6.704 ± 0.253
No corrections	$59.10\% \pm 3.19\%$	6.976 ± 0.168
Corrections	$62.91\% \pm 3.36\%$	6.775 ± 0.231

Figure 5: Comparison between unmodified images, images with data embedded but without statistical corrections, and finally images with data embedded plus statistical corrections.




Figure 6: The extended χ^2 -test detects the embedding for the image that has no statistical corrections. Our naive correction is even more detectable. However, the image that received the proper statistical correction can not be distinguished from an unmodified image.

indicates a maximum message size that was smaller than the one we try to embed.

Figure 5 shows the results for the simple statistics that operate only on the redundant data. We note that there is a noticeable increase in entropy for images that have not received statistical correction. The correlation towards one decreases noticeably, too. However, for the images that have been corrected for statistical distortions the values are very close to the data from the unmodified images. These simple tests are thus not able to detect our steganography.

The more interesting statistic is the DCT frequency histogram. If we plot the DCT histogram of images that have received corrections, we are no longer able to find noticeable differences in the distribution. Figure 6 shows the extended χ^2 -test. The tests detect the image without corrections and the




Figure 7: Examining the differences in the DCT histogram for parts of the image shows no noticeable deviations from the unmodified original. The largest difference is around 0.2%.

image corrected with our naive method, but it is unable to detect the image corrected for statistical deviations with the transform in Algorithm 1.

To verify the correctness of the *a priori* estimate, we embed messages of different sizes and apply the correcting transform. We note that for message sizes below the estimate the transform is able to correct most errors. Increasing the message size above the estimate causes a noticeable increase in errors.

The transform also has to meet the restriction that there be no area in the image that shows noticeable distortion in the DCT coefficients. Figure 7 shows the histogram difference of a modified image in comparison to the original. The differences in the frequency of the DCT coefficients are negligible, thus the extended χ^2 -test does not indicate any hidden data.

8 Conclusion

Even though steganography is often undetectable by the observer’s senses, statistical analysis can reveal the presence of a hidden message.

Although the commonly used χ^2 -test is unable to

detect modifications from the embedding process outlined in this paper, we were able to create an extended χ^2 -test that is capable of detecting modified areas in parts of an image.

To counter statistical tests based on frequency counts like the extended χ^2 -test, we introduced a new method to correct the statistical deviations from the embedding process and a correcting transform for the JPEG format. As a result, none of the presented statistical tests can detect the presence of steganography. We also presented an *a priori* estimate that allows us to determine the amount of data that can be hidden in an image while still being able to preserve frequency count based statistics. Given a hidden message, we can use the estimate to quickly choose an image in which a specific message can be embedded safely.

The method of introducing corrections to preserve statistical properties has been implemented in the OutGuess [6] program, which is freely available as source code at www.outguess.org.

9 Acknowledgments

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